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Abstract
Through the mathematical study of two models we quantify some of the theories of co-
development and co-existence of focused groups in the social sciences. This work attempts to
develop the mathematical framework behind the social sciences of community formation. By
using well developed theories and concepts from ecology and epidemiology we hope to extend the
theoretical framework of organizing and self-organizing social groups and communities, including
terrorist groups. The main goal of our work is to gain insight into the role of recruitment and
retention in the formation and survival of social organizations. Understanding the underlining
mechanisms of the spread of ideologies under competition is a fundamental component of this
work. Here contacts between core and non-core individuals extend beyond its physical meaning
to include indirect interaction and spread of ideas through phone conversations, emails, media
sources, and other similar mean.This work focuses on the dynamics of formation of interest
groups, either ideological, economical or ecological and thus we explore the questions such as,
how do interest groups initiate and co-develop by interacting within a common environment and
how do they sustain themselves? Our results show that building and maintaining the core group
is essential for the existence and survival of an extreme ideology. Our research also indicates
that in the absence of competitive ability (i.e., ability to take from the other core group or
share prospective members) the social organization or group that is more committed to its
group ideology and manages to strike the right balance between investment in recruitment and
retention will prevail. Thus under no cross interaction between two social groups a single trade-
off (of these efforts) can support only a single organization. The more efforts that an organization
implements to recruit and retain its members the more effective it will be in transmitting the
ideology to other vulnerable individuals and thus converting them to believers.
keywords: competing interest groups; extreme ideology; epidemiological model
1 Introduction
The events in recent years have triggered a desire to understand fanatic behavior on a global scale.
Behind the formation of most rebellious forces there is a period of competition for support with other
similar forces, where groups try to build themselves from the bottom up with the main objective
of increasing their strength (which depends on many variables). Under the assumption of constant
environmental conditions, equal resources and group capacities among other relevant factors the
only thing that could cause differences in strength would be the critical mass of each respective
group. In this very simplistic setting, most anti-fanatic policy makers would be in agreement with
“the common sense view that the most effective counterterrorist approach consists of depriving
fanatic groups from recruitment sources” while discouraging some of there current members [8].
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In such a setting where recruitment and retention are vital to the group existence, it is crucial
to understand and mathematically formulate the mechanism by which fanatic groups establish a
critical mass. An epidemiological model with homogeneous mixing can help us accomplish this.
There are numerous examples where individuals have influenced one another even though they
have never met in person. This can happen for example via a phone conversation or electronic
mail. It is this type of contact that we assume in our work and thereby attempt to develop
some qualitative framework that might shed light on possible ways of fighting extreme ideologies
(fanaticism) that might hinder mankind. In an effort to better understand the spread of ideas
in a vulnerable population we have extended the work of Castillo-Chavez and Song to include
interaction between two interest groups [8]. We assume that interaction includes competition,
cooperation, and synergy. Interest groups may include but are not limited to those which are
socially active, focused politically, unions, educational groups, informal social groups, professional
societies, fanatic groups, terrorists, and religious groups. In particular, we study the spread of
ideas as an epidemiological contact process where the populations in each subclass are assumed
to be different but homogeneous within each subclass. Transmission of ideas is not an individual-
to-individual process but rather part of a group effort A key element in this work is the trade off
between recruitment of individuals into the core population and retention. Here contacts between
core and non-core individuals extend beyond its physical meaning to include indirect interaction
and spread of ideas through phone conversations, emails, media sources, and other similar means.
Our mathematical work is not intended to predict the evolution of any two specific fanatic ideolo-
gies in our current society but rather to give a very general qualitative measure of the forces behind
fanatic acts and the social structure that facilitates the existence of such groups [2],[18],[19],[20],[21],
[23],[24], [26]. It is important to note that the concepts of ideology, fanatic, and terrorist behavior
are too vague and complex to be defined in this work. In this work we hope to gain some insight
into possible mechanisms by which social organizations form due to a shared common ideology
among its potential members or due to group pressure. Understanding this will help us identify
the conditions and limiting factors that allow certain social groups to prevail.
Since we are considering a homogeneous population, our study does not explicitly incorporate
heterogeneity; however, group appeal (or individual preference) which is key under competition
of social groups, especially fanatic groups, is incorporated via recruitment. The generalization of
recruitment in this setting is growth due to attraction (or maybe even coercion). Extending the
work of Castillo-Chavez and Song, we develop a mathematical framework to systematically study
the transmission of ideas under competition from a population dynamics approach. We build-on
their model and consider multiple ideologies. We imagine that fanatics can only draw support
to their extreme views and convert individuals from susceptible subpopulations, the core groups.
Only the individuals in the core subpopulations are vulnerable and receptive to transmission. The
recruitment process is modeled based on the work of [8],[11],[13],[25].
We propose two models describing the dynamics in the evolution of two organizations. One
with interaction between the core groups and one with no interaction (i.e., with and without
competitive ability/ cross-recruitment between the competing ideologies), which we will refer to
as the cross interaction model and non-cross interaction model, respectively. Following [8] and
drawing from [20]’s triadic system we imagine that the total population, N(t), is divided into the
non-core population, defined as G(t), and the core population(s), defined as C1(t), C2(t), and C(t).
The core populations are made up of vulnerable (or naive) individuals, S(t) or Si(t), semi-fanatics,
Ei(t), and fanatics, Fi(t) for i = 1, 2, in other words individuals who have been introduced, have
adopted, and are fully committed to ideology i, respectively. In the cross interaction model there is
only one core subpopulation, C(t) = S(t) +E1(t) +E2(t) +F1(t) +F2(t), as ideology 1 and 2 share
some characteristics in the initial stages of evolution of their respective organization but diverge as
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their followers become more committed. The parallel characteristics allows for these organizations
to cross-recruit and share prospective members. The non-cross interaction model, has two core
groups, Ci(t) = Si(t) + Ei(t) + Fi(t), i = 1, 2, consisting of ideology 1 and 2, respectively. In both
models, the group G(t) serves as the recruitment pool for the core group(s).
The main goal of this work is to extend the theoretical framework of organizing and self-
organizing social groups/communities by using well developed theories and concepts from ecology
and epidemiology. In particular, to gain insight of the role of recruitment and retention in the
formation and survival of social organizations, understanding the underlining mechanisms of the
spread of ideologies under competition will be fundamental.
2 Description of the non-cross interaction model
In the non-cross interaction model, the movement of individuals into various fanatic classes within
each core group is modeled identical to that of [8], except that now there are two core groups,
C1(t) = S1(t) + E1(t) + F1(t) and C2(t) = S2(t) + E2(t) + F2(t). The ith core subpopulation,
Ci(t), contains three classes: the vulnerable subpopulation, Si(t), composed of individuals who
have not yet been converted but are part of the core group; the semi-fanatic group, Ei(t), which
includes all the members that have just been converted and are not fully committed; and, the
fanatic subpopulation, Fi(t), composed of individual which are fully committed to the extreme
ideology. The core groups C1(t) and C2(t) recruit some portions q and (1− q) of individuals from
the general population, G(t), respectively. From there individuals move to the semi-fanatic and
the fanatic classes by interacting with members of these respective groups. Assuming homogeneous
mixing between all groups, the governing equations defining this process are
dG
dt
= Λ− qβ1GC1
N
− (1− q)β1GC2
N
+ γ1S1 + γ2E1 + γ3F1 + α1S2 + α2E2 + α3F2 − µG,(1)
dS1
dt
=
qβ1GC1
N
− β2S1(E1 + F1)
C1
− γ1S1 − µS1, (2)
dS2
dt
=
(1− q)β1GC2
N
− ρ2S2(E2 + F2)
C2
− α1S2 − µS2, (3)
dE1
dt
=
β2S1(E1 + F1)
C1
− β3E1F1
C1
− µE1 − γ2E1, (4)
dE2
dt
=
ρ2S2(E2 + F2)
C2
− ρ3E2F2
C2
− µE2 − α2E2, (5)
dF1
dt
=
β3E1F1
C1
− γ3F1 − µF1, (6)
dF2
dt
=
ρ3E2F2
C2
− α3F2 − µF2, (7)
where all parameters are nonnegative and where the total population, N(t), and the core groups
C1(t) and C2(t), are given by
N = G+ S1 + S2 + E1 + E2 + F1 + F2
C1 = S1 + E1 + F1
C2 = S2 + E2 + F2.
Since our variables define groups of individuals in the various populations, initially they must satisfy
G(0) > 0, Si(0) ≥ 0, Ei(0) ≥ 0, Fi(0) ≥ 0.
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A pictorial illustration of this model is given in Figure1.
Figure 1: Flow diagram for the non-cross interaction model.
We assume a constant birth rate, Λ, into the general population. The core groups, Ci(t),
i = 1, 2, build their membership from the general population, G(t), and convert them at the rates
qβ1GC1/N and (1− q)β1GC1/N , respectively. The recruitment effect, measured by β1 includes the
attractiveness of the core group, the resonance with the ideologies of this group, and the likelihood
to join based on exposure to these ideas. Thus the parameter β1 serves as a measurement of the
relative strength of the recruitment force of the core groups. Each β1 together with the parameter
q defines the investment efforts that each fanatic group puts into recruiting their members. Core
group, C1(t), invest qβ1 efforts into recruiting while core group C2(t) invests (1 − q)β1. Thus the
relative sizes of q and (1−q) determines which group invests more in recruitment. The parameter q
illustrates how our model assumes competition between two focused groups where one focused group
cannot increase its recruitment effort without the other decreasing its effort, except by increasing
its numbers. Since our model follows an epidemiological approach, all conversions into a more
active class occur only through effective contacts and they are assumed to be proportional to the
number of contacts per unit time.
Once an idea has infiltrated the general population and a core group is formed (i.e., once
an epidemic has started), individuals can return to the previous less active subgroup (and hence
ultimately end up in the general class, G(t)) through a recovery process. The rate of return to the
G(t) class depends on the number of individuals in the respective Ei(t) or Fi(t) class. Ideology
groups tend to lose numbers when there is lack of direction, which is captured by these groups. We
imagine that the more fanatic an individual becomes the less likely he/she is to move to a less active
group (because he/she has a stronger sense of commitment to his/her ideology). We assume that the
residence time in the core groups are exponentially distributed and we let γi and αi denote the per-
capita recovery rates for each subgroup in the core subpopulations Ci(t) for i = 1, 2, respectively.
The average residence time for susceptibles, S1(t), semi-fanatics E1(t), and fanatics, F1(t), in the
core group, C1(t) are 1/(γi + µ) for i = 1, 2, 3, respectively. Similarly, the average residence time
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for the corresponding subpopulations in the core group, C2(t), are 1/(αi + µ) for i = 1, 2, 3. The
assumption that the more fanatic individuals have stronger ties translates to longer time spent in
the more active group. Hence we assume 1/(α3 + µ)  1 and 1/(γ3 + µ)  1. The investment
efforts in retention (that is, of keeping members within a particular group), of each focused group
is measured by the minimum recovery rate, γ = min{γ1, γ2, γ3} and α = min{α1, α2, α3}.
The equation N˙(t) = Λ− µN , governs the dynamics of the total population, N(t), and thus in
the long run the total population is given by Λ/µ, i.e., limt→∞N(t) = Λ/µ. We use the relationship
between the dynamics of non-autonomous systems and their natural limiting systems to reduce the
dimension of our system. We replace N(t) and G(t) by Λ/µ and Λ/µ−(C1(t)+C2(t)), respectively,
in the equations 2-7. Hence, we obtain the dynamically equivalent system,
dS1
dt
= −S1β2(F1 + E1)
C1
+ qβ1(C1 − C21 − C1C2)− S1(γ1 + µ), (8)
dS2
dt
= −S2ρ2(F2 + E2)
C2
+ (1− q)β1(C2 − C22 − C1C2)− S2(α1 + µ), (9)
dE1
dt
=
β2S1(E1 + F1)
C1
− β3E1F1
C1
− µE1 − γ2E1, (10)
dE2
dt
=
ρ2S2(E2 + F2)
C2
− ρ3E2F2
C2
− µE2 − α2E2, (11)
dF1
dt
=
β3E1F1
C1
− γ3F1 − µF1, (12)
dF2
dt
=
ρ3E2F2
C2
− α3F2 − µF2, (13)
where
C1 = S1 + E1 + F1
C2 = S2 + E2 + F2.
2.1 Core Population
We analyze the long term sustainability of the core population by utilizing the idea of the basic
reproductive number from epidemiology. With this underlining framework we can conclude that for
certain parameter values, the model predicts the extinction of both core subpopulations, C1(t) and
C2(t). Likewise we can show when the core population will persist.
Theorem 2.1 (i) Assume γ = min{γ1, γ2, γ3} and R1,min ≡ qβ1γ+µ < 1. Then limt→∞C1(t)→ 0.
(ii) Assume α = min{α1, α2, α3} and R2,min ≡ (1−q)β1α+µ < 1. Then limt→∞C2(t)→ 0.
(iii) Assume τ = min{γ1, γ2, γ3, α1, α2, α3} and Rmin ≡ β1τ+µ < 1 Then limt→∞C(t)→ 0.
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Proof: Observing that Ci = Si + Ei + Fi for i = 1, 2, we calculate the change in the first core
population C1 as
dC1
dt
= qβ1C1(1− (C1 + C2))− (γ1 + µ)S1 − (γ2 + µ)E1 − (γ3 + µ)F1
≤ qβ1C1(1− (C1 + C2))− (γ + µ)C1
≤ qβ1C1 − (γ + µ)C1
= −(γ + µ)C1
(
1− qβ1
γ + µ
)
< 0, (14)
where the last inequality holds because of the assumptions in (i). A similar proof shows that
dC2/dt < 0 under (ii). Thus we see that the core populations will die out under the conditions of
this theorem.
For part (iii), we observe that
dC1
dt
+
dC2
dt
≤ β1q(C1(C1 − 1)− C2(C2 − 1))− (τ + µ)C1 − (τ + µ)C2 + C2β1(1− C1 − C2)
= β1qC1(1− (C1 + C2)) + (1− q)β1C2(1− (C1 + C2))− (τ + µ)(C1 + C2)
≤ β1qC1 + (1− q)β1C2 − (τ + µ)(C1 + C2)
= −C1(τ + µ)
(−β1q
τ + µ
+ 1
)
− C2(τ + µ)
(
1− (1− q)β1
τ + µ
)
= −C1(τ + µ)(1−Rmin)− C2(τ + µ)(1− (1− q)Rmin). (15)
Because 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, the conclusion of (iii) follows immediately.
The death of the core population also corresponds to the first of three equilibria where there is
no established ideology for the non-cross recruiting model. These equilibria correspond to a social
state where no fanatic organization is present. In the spirit of evoking mathematical epidemiology
in this work we will refer to these three equilibria as disease-free equilibria (DFE).
DFE0 : (S1, S2) = (0, 0)
DFE1 : (S1, S2) =
(
1− γ1 + µ
qβ1
, 0
)
DFE2 : (S1, S2) =
(
0, 1− α1 + µ
β1(1− q)
)
.
In DFE1 and DFE2, we observe that only one of the ideologies has a non-zero susceptible class
from which it may draw to establish its organization. This indicates that only one fanatic group
will persist under constant environmental conditions as the model does not account for external
environmental changes that can perturb the system. Hence this model exhibits the competitive
exclusion principle (CEP) which can be thought of as stating that two species (in this case social
organizations) cannot coexist unless their limiting factors differ and are independent [15]. In the
context of this work one could think of the core subpopulations, C1(t) and C2(t), as the species
and the general population group, G(t), as the limiting factor (the entity that each focused group
feeds from to grow and increase its membership).
The work on the CEP goes back to Grinnell (1904,1917), and it was first formalized by Volterra
in 1926 when he showed that only one species can live of a single resource [6],[15]. The disagreement
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between the mathematical validity of this principle and the ecological observations of diverse species
supported by a few resources has provided continued interest in the CEP. Since Volterra the theory
of CEP has been extended to consider multiple species and resources with various trophic elements
and the effect of variable environmental conditions on these types of predator-prey relations [28].
The fueled interest in the CEP lies primarily in the desire to understand the mechanisms that
maintain the earth’s vast biodiversity [16]. Our interest in this principle comes from the possibility
of finding the crucial factors for coexistence and fitness advantage of organizations.
From the disease-free equilibria, we will be able to obtain the basic reproductive number, which
quantifies how successful an ideology is in thriving. In epidemiological terms, the basic reproductive
number gives the number of secondary infections caused by a primary infected individual in a
completely susceptible population. In the context of our work the basic reproductive number
quantifies the number of new believers that are converted, from an entire population of unbelievers,
by one single believer during the time in which he/she holds that ideology. Under the assumptions
of our model, this number will depend on the trade-off between transmissibility and the average
recovery rate of each core group. In other words, it will depend on the trade-off between investment
(time, money, etc.) on recruitment and investment on retention [10],[3]. The core group with the
higher basic reproductive number will drive the other core group to extinction, for it will seize all
the individuals in the general population, G(t) until there are no more individuals left to convert or
recruit. Surviving in this case implies keeping a good balance between recruitment and retention.
Recall that the efforts that the core groups C1(t) and C2(t) put into recruitment are quantified
by qβ1 and (1 − q)β1, respectively, and their cost of retention is measured by the minimum per-
capita recovery rate of the subclasses embedded in these core groups, γ = min{γ1, γ2, γ3} and
α = min{α1, α2, α3}. Thus longer resident times in the subclasses, Si(t), Ei(t), and Fi(t), for
i = 1, 2 increase the cost of retention for the respective fanatic groups.
Theorem 2.2 Let R˜3 =
β3
γ3+µ
< 1and R̂3 =
ρ3
α3+µ
< 1. Then F1(t)→ 0, F2(t)→ 0 as t→∞.
Proof: We consider the F1 and F2 equations:
dF1
dt
= −(γ3 + µ)F1
(
−
(
β3
γ3 + µ
)
E1
C1
+ 1
)
= −(γ3 + µ)F1E1
C1
(
C1
E1
−
(
β3
γ3 + µ
))
= −(γ3 + µ)F1E1
C1
(
C1
E1
− R˜3
)
(16)
dF2
dt
= −(α3 + µ)F2E2
C2
(
C2
E2
− R̂3
)
. (17)
We observe that CiEi ≥ 1, i = 1, 2. The claim follows immediately.
To obtain the conditions under which the fanatic groups Fi(t) become established, we analyze
the stability of the DFE by considering the dynamics of the subsystem before fanatic groups are
able to rise. We let
R˜i =
βi
γi + µ
, i = 1, 2, 3, R̂1 =
β1
α1 + µ
, R̂i =
ρi
αi + µ
, i = 2, 3, with R˜3 < 1, R̂3 < 1 (18)
The following theorem gives conditions for the stability of the three DFE.
Theorem 2.3 With R˜i, R̂i defined as in (18), we have
(i) DFE0 is stable when R˜1 <
1
q and R̂1 <
1
1−q
(ii) DFE1 is stable when
1
q < R˜1 and R˜2 < 1
(iii) DFE2 is stable when all three conditions R˜1q < (1−q)R̂1, 11−q < R̂1, and R̂2 < 1 are satisfied.
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Proof: We can prove the stability of DFEi by examination of their eigenvalues. Let λij represent
the eigenvalues of the DFEi in the subsystem given by equations (8) -(11). We obtain
λ01 = −(γ1 + µ) + β1q, λ02 = −(α1 + µ) + β1(1− q), λ03 = −(γ2 + µ),
λ04 = −(α2 + µ) (19)
λ11 = −β1q + (γ1 + µ), λ12 = −(α1 + µ)− (γ1 + µ) + γ1 + µ
q
,
λ13 = β2 − (γ2 + µ), λ14 = −(α2 + µ) (20)
λ21 =
q
1− q (α1 + µ)− (γ1 + µ), λ22 = −β1(1− q) + (α1 + µ),
λ23 = −(γ2 + µ), λ24 = ρ2 − (α2 + µ) (21)
The theorem follows by requiring λij < 0.
The stability of each DFE together with bifurcation analysis predicts that in the long run at
most one of the ideologies will persist. The equilibria DFEi, i = 1, 2 are born in forward bifurcations
with DFE0. In the subsystem under consideration, there also exist two endemic equilibria, EE1
and EE2 where an ideology has already infiltrated the population and is to thriving among the
group of vulnerable (or naive) individuals, Si(t) as well as among the group of semi-fanatics, Ei(t).
These endemic equilibria are involved in bifurcations with DFEi, i = 1, 2, respectively, and are
given by
EE1 :
{
S1 =
(γ2 + µ)(β1qβ2 − γ1γ2 − γ2β2 + γ22 + γ2µ− γ1µ− β2µ)
β1qβ22
, S2 = 0
}
,
{
E1 =
−(β1qβ2 − γ1γ2 − γ2β2 + γ22 + γ2µ− γ1µ− β2µ)(−β2 + γ2 + µ)
β1qβ22
, E2 = 0
}
EE2 :
{
S1 = 0, S2 =
(α2 + µ)(β1qρ2 − β1ρ2 + α2ρ2 − α22 + α1α2 + ρ2µ− α2µ+ α1µ)
β1ρ22(q − 1)
}
,
{
E1 = 0, E2 =
−(β1qρ2 − β1ρ2 + α2ρ2 − α22 + α1α2 + ρ2µ− α2µ+ α1µ)(−ρ2 + α2 + µ)
β1ρ22(q − 1)
}
Theorem 2.4 The equilibria EE1 and DFE1 undergo a forward transcritical bifurcation when
R˜2 = 1 with the EE1 existing biologically when R˜2 > 1. Similarly, the equilibria EE2 and DFE2
undergo a forward trancritical bifurcation when R̂2 = 1 with the EE2 existing biologically when
R̂2 > 1
Proof: To prove the statement about EE1 and DFE1, we first observe that EE1 = DFE1 when
γ2 + µ = β2, i.e., when R˜2 = 1. We first rewrite EE1 in terms of R˜1 and R˜2. The E1 coordinate of
EE1 is
E1 =
γ1(qR˜1R˜2 − 1) + γ1(1− R˜2) + µR˜2(qR˜1 − 1)
R˜22R˜1(γ1 + µ)
.
We let R˜1 =
1
q + δ and R˜2 = 1 + , where δ is not necessarily small but ||  1. Expanding in 
gives
E1 =
δq
1 + δq
+O(2).
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Thus for  < 0, we have R˜2 < 1⇒ E1 < 0 whereas for  > 0, we have R˜2 > 1⇒ E1 > 0. For EE2,
we similarly rewrite the expression for E2 in terms of R̂1 and R̂2:
E2 =
[
α2
2(R̂2 − 1) + (µ2 + µα1 + µα2R̂2)[1− (1− q)R̂1] + α1α2[1− (1− q)R̂1R̂2]
]
α2(R̂2 − 1)
R̂1(α1 + µ)(R̂2α2 + µ)2(q − 1)
.
We let R̂1 =
1
1−q + δ and R̂2 = 1 + , where δ is not necessarily small but ||  1. Expanding in 
gives
E2 =
δ(1− q)α2
1 + δ(1− q)(µ+ α2) +O(
2).
Thus for  < 0, we have R̂2 < 1 ⇒ E2 < 0 whereas for  > 0, we have R̂2 > 1 ⇒ E2 > 0. The
theorem follows since the structure of S1 and S2 in the respective equilibria differs only by a factor
related to R˜2 and R̂2, respectively.
This is again consistent with the persistence of only one ideology. The core group that maximizes
their basic reproductive number will prevail. Building a critical mass of individuals committed to
the ideology and sustaining it is crucial for the existence and survivability of the organization
[3],[12]. The results of this mathematical model reveal that without cross interaction of population
being recruited by two organizations (in other words the ability to take over from the other core
group or share prospective members) both fanatic ideologies cannot exist in the long run. In the
next section we show that in order for persistence of both fanatic ideologies, we need to have cross
interaction of the populations being recruited by the two ideologies. Including additional trade-offs
between recovery rate and competitive ability (ability to take over individuals/resources from the
other core groups or share resources, i.e., the presence of cross interaction) may not necessarily
favor the fanatic group with the largest reproductive number and may in fact support coexistence
of multiple fanatic groups and organizations [1].
3 Description of the cross interaction model
We have so far considered an ideal situation in which the environmental conditions are not chang-
ing, the population is homogeneous (i.e., the species are identical with identical limiting factors -
ecological preferences), and there is no interaction between the two core groups. We now consider
modifications to the model where our new equations describe cross interaction of the competing
ideologies. Cross interaction (cross recruitment), recovery and demography are mechanisms respon-
sible for the competitive exclusion and/ or coexistence of two related social groups (species)[7]. In
an attempt to better understand the key components of that lead to the survival of social organiza-
tions we now extend the model to consider cross interaction of competing ideologies. The governing
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equation of this new model are given by:
dG
dt
= Λ + γ3F1 + γ2E1 + α2E2 + α3F2 + γ1S − β1GC
N
− µG (22)
dS
dt
=
β1GC
N
− β2S(E1 + qE2 + F1)
C
− ρ2S(qE1 + E2 + F2)
C
− γ1S − µS (23)
dE1
dt
=
β2S(E1 + qE2 + F1)
C
− γ2E1 − β3E1F1
C
+
ρ4E2(qE1 + F1)
C
− β4E1(qE2 + F2)
C
−µE1 − β5E1F2
C
(24)
dE2
dt
=
ρ2S(qE1 + E2 + F2)
C
− α2E2 − ρ3E2F2
C
− ρ4E2(qE1 + F1)
C
+
β4E1(qE2 + F2)
C
−µE2 − ρ5E2F1
C
(25)
dF1
dt
=
β3E1F1
C
− γ3F1 − µF1 + ρ5E2F1
C
(26)
dF2
dt
=
ρ3E2F2
C
− α3F2 − µF2 + β5E1F2
C
(27)
where all parameters are nonnegative and where the total population, N(t), and the core group,
C(t), are define as
N = G+ S + E1 + E2 + F1 + F2
C = S + E1 + E2 + F1 + F2.
For simplicity we set the parameters β5 and ρ5 to zero. We see that one of the main differences be-
tween this and the previous model is that the vulnerable individuals are initially under the influence
of both ideologies. At this first stage of conversion the two ideologies seem to be very similar and
indistinguishable from the perspective of the vulnerable, naive, and susceptible individuals in the
S(t) group. Both ideologies initiate the conversion of naive individuals but as the individuals starts
to become more committed the ideologies diverge to distinct ideas and only one of the ideologies
can now be influential. However, these two distinct ideologies still share some parallel characteristic
and thus they are able to recruit members from the semi-fanatic group of the other organization
and convert them. A pictorial illustration of this model is given in Figure 2.
Similar to the previous model we can mathematically formulate the existence of at least one
fanatic group for some given parameter by considering the core population. The establishment of
the core population can be stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 Let
γ = min{γ1, γ2, γ3, α2, α3}
and define
R1 =
β1
γ + µ
.
Suppose R1 < 1. Then C → 0 as t→∞.
10
Figure 2: Flow diagram for the cross interaction model.
Proof: Adding the relevant equations gives
dC
dt
≤ −C(β1C + γ + µ− β1)
= β1(1− C)C − (γ + µ)C
= C(β1(1− C)− (γ + µ))
= C
(
(1− c) β1
γ + µ
)
(γ + µ)
= C(γ + µ)
(
β1
γ + µ
(1− C)− 1
)
< (γ + µ)
β1
γ + µ
C − (γ + µ)C
= C(γ + µ)(R1 − 1) (28)
The conclusions follow from the assumptions of the theorem.
As before, we can examine the disease-free equilibria for the cross recruiting model:
DFE1 :
{
G =
Λ
µ
, S = 0
}
DFE2 :
{
G =
Λ(γ1 + µ)
β1µ
, S =
−Λ(−β1 + γ1 + µ)
β1µ
}
Note that setting β5 = ρ5 = 0 does not change the dynamics of the disease-free equilibria. The
previous theorem shows that DFE1 will be stable when R1 < 1, since the equilibrium point DFE1
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coincides with the core group’s population being zero. If we let R˜1 =
β1
γ1+µ
, then DFE2 is given by{
G =
Λ
R˜1µ
, S =
Λ
µ
(
1− 1
R˜1
)}
.
This equilibrium point is relevant to our application only when R˜1 > 1 otherwise we will have
negative population size. In order to prove its stability, we first consider the case when the fanatic
populations, F1 and F2 go to zero. From equation (26) it follows that if
β3
γ3+µ
< 1 then F1(t)→ 0,
as t → ∞. Similarly, we see from equation (27) that if ρ3α3+µ < 1 then F2(t) → 0 as t → ∞. This
can readily be observed by setting β5 = ρ5 = 0 and rearranging the terms in equations (26) and
(27). In considering the stability of DFE2, we define
R2 =
β2
γ2 + µ
, R˜2 =
ρ2
α2 + µ
,R3 =
β3
γ3 + µ
, R˜3 =
ρ3
α3 + µ
and
Rd =
q2β2ρ2
(γ2 + µ)(α2 + µ)
+
β2
γ2 + µ
+
ρ2
α2 + µ
β2ρ2
(γ2 + µ)(α2 + µ)
+ 1
=
q2R2R˜2 +R2 + R˜2
R2R˜2 + 1
Theorem 3.2 Let R1 > 1, R3 < 1, R˜3 < 1, R2 < 1, R˜2 < 1, Rd < 1. Then DFE2 is stable.
Proof: Two of the eigenvalues are on the diagonal and are given as
−(γ3 + µ),−(α3 + µ).
The remaining submatrix is in block diagonal form with each submatrix being a 2-by-2 matrix.
One of these submatrices yields the eigenvalues
−µ,−(β1 + γ1 + µ).
The remaining two eigenvalues are determined by the 2-by-2 submatrix
J1 =
(
β2 − γ2 − µ β2q
ρ2q ρ2 − α2 − µ
)
We will have stability when tr(J1) < 0 and det(J1) > 0. The trace condition is equivalent to
β2 + ρ2 < 2µ+ γ2 + α2. The determinant condition is equivalent to Rd < 1.
Claim: det(J1) > 0⇒ tr(J1) < 0
Proof of Claim: The condition Rd < 1, i.e., det(J1) > 0 can be rewritten as
β2 + ρ2 <
1
µ
(
µ2 + β2ρ2 + γ2α2 + γ2µ+ µα2 − β2q2ρ2 − β2α2 − γ2ρ2
)
≤ 1
µ
[
µ2 + µ(γ2 + α2) + (β2 − γ2)(ρ2 − α2)
]
= µ+ (γ2 + α2) +
1
µ
(β2 − γ2)(ρ2 − α2). (29)
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But R2 < 1⇒ β2 − γ2 < µ. Similarly R˜2 < 1⇒ ρ2 − α2 < µ. Thus the proof now becomes
β2 + ρ2 < µ+ (γ2 + α2) +
1
µ
(µµ)
= 2µ+ γ2 + α2. (30)
This is exactly the condition for tr(J1) < 0 and the Claim is proved.
Thus stability of the equilibria will hold when det(J1) > 0 which is exactly the same as requiring
Rd < 1.
Corollary 3.1 Let R1 > 1, R3 < 1, R˜3 < 1, R2 < 1, R˜2 < 1, and Rd > 1. Then DFE2 is unstable.
Proof: Under these conditions, we have det(J1) < 0 which shows the instability.
We now give an interpretation of Rd, used in the previous theorem and corollary.
The inverse of the denominator of R2 above, (γ2 + µ), is the mean time and individual spent
in the E1 group. The numerator is the rate at which individuals the S group move to E1 group
due to interactions with individuals in E1, E2, and F1 groups. Thus, R2 is the product of the
mean time spent in E1 times the rate that S individuals move into E1. It quantifies how successful
the organization with ideology 1 is in converting vulnerable and naive individuals into new semi-
fanatics, E1, as well as retaining them in this group. This success is due to efforts and interactions
of members in E1, E2, and F1 with individuals in S that ultimately adopt ideology 1. The parallel
characteristics of the two ideologies (as limited and few as they might be) from the perspective of
the vulnerable and naive individuals in S are such that the two ideologies are very similar and thus
followers of ideology 2, who are not fully committed believers but have adopted the ideology, can
convert S individuals to E1. Similarly, R˜2 is the product of the mean time spent in the semi-fanatic
group, E2, times the rate that S individuals move into the E2 class due to interactions with the
individuals in the groups, E1, E2, and F2. It quantifies the success of the organization with ideology
2 in recruiting and retaining individuals in the semi fanatic group E2. The expression qR2 is the
product of the mean time spent in E1 times the rate that S individuals move into E1 class due to
interactions with the member in the semi-fanatic group E2. It is a measurement of the success in
retention and recruitment into the group E1 brought about by interactions with members of group
E2. Even though individuals in groups E1 and E2 are committed to some degree to their respective
ideologies 1 and 2, they still have not fully embraced or don’t fully understand the organization’s
ideology and thus can be persuaded by fanatics and semi-fanatics of the opposing organization
to adopt the other ideology and move to the respective semi-fanatic group. It serves as a way of
quantifying the benefit that the interactions of the individuals in E1 with those in S bring to the
recruitment of E2 and the retention efforts as it pertains to this class from the entire organization.
Similarly the expression qR˜2 is the product of the average residence time in E2 times the rate
that S individuals move into E2 due to interactions with members of E1. In the numerator of Rd we
see the effectiveness of the ideologies in thriving among the semi-fanatics. It illustrates the success
of converting members of S to believers of the two ideologies and maintaining their commitment.
This depends on the independent success of both organizations (represented by the R2 and R˜2
terms) as well as the indirect benefit obtained from the semi-fanatics in the opposing organization
(represented by qR2 and qR˜2). This makes sense because the numerator should depend on how
successful the recruiting of S individuals into the E1 and E2 classes is and the average residence
time in both classes, E1 and E2. The denominator is the product of R2 and R˜2 summed with 1.
The presence of the “+1” in the denominator indicates that even if there is no cross-recruiting by
13
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Figure 3: In the top panel of left figure, the DFE1 is stable and both ideologies die off with β2 =
.25, q = .52, ρ2 = .5 (so that R˜2 =
25
51 and R˜1 =
200
81 >
1
q ). In the bottom panel of the left figure, EE1
is now stable and the first ideology persists with β2 = .528, q = .527, ρ2 = .5 (so that R˜2 ≈ 1.035).
The right two plots of the left figure are simply magnifications of the left plots. In the top panel
of right figure, the DFE2 is stable and both ideologies die off with β2 = .25, q = .01, ρ2 = .01 (so
that R̂2 ≈ .0192, R̂1 = 20081 > 11−q , and R˜1 = 20081 ). In the bottom panel of the right figure, EE2 is
now stable and the second ideology persists with β2 = .25, q = .01, ρ2 = .85 (so that R̂2 ≈ 1.635).
The right two plots of the right figure are simply magnifications of the left plots. All plots have a
vertical log scale in order to see the curves that exponentially go to zero.
the classes with different ideology (i.e., β = 0 or ρ = 0), it’s still possible to have Rd > 1. This
again makes intuitive sense. In such a case the total combine success of both ideologies depends on
the sum of their relative success, quantify by R2 and R˜2 . The cross-recruiting increases Rd (since
q 6= 0), whereas the lack of cross-recruiting (i.e., q = 0) changes Rd in a natural way.
4 Numerical Results
The key difference between the two models is whether individuals are allowed to switch between
ideologies. Figure 3 demonstrates the results of Theorem 2.4 in which only one of the ideologies is
able to persist. In each case, there is a critical threshold in which a single ideology can take hold.
In both subfigures, we have
γ1 =
1
50
, γ2 =
13
50
, γ3 =
1
4
, β1 =
2
3
, β3 =
1
2
,
µ =
1
4
, ρ1 =
1
2
, ρ3 =
1
2
, α1 =
1
50
, α2 =
27
100
, α3 =
1
4
, (31)
and we vary β2, ρ2, q as described in the captions. The left plot of Figure 3 demonstrates the
conditions under which the first ideology is established whereas the right plot of Figure 3 shows
the conditions under which the second ideology is established.
In contrast to the results of the non-cross interaction model, the cross interaction model permits
the co-existence of competing ideologies. This is a key difference between the two models as this co-
existence is observed in many real world systems with competing ideologies. Figure 4 demonstrates
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Figure 4: In the top panel, the DFE is stable and both ideologies die off with q = .0001 (so that
Rd ≈ .99961). In the bottom panel, the EE is now stable and the both ideologies persist with
q = .2 (so that Rd ≈ 1.0146). The right two plots of the figure are simply magnifications of the left
plots. All plots have a vertical log scale in order to see the curves that exponentially go to zero.
the results of Theorem 2.6 and its Corollary. With parameter values
γ1 =
1
4
, γ2 =
13
50
, γ3 =
1
4
, β1 =
2
3
, β2 =
1
2
, β3 =
2
5
, β4 =
1
2
, β5 =
1
2
,
µ =
1
4
, ρ2 =
4
10
, ρ3 =
2
5
, ρ4 =
51
100
, ρ5 =
1
2
, α2 =
27
100
, α3 =
1
4
, (32)
we can vary the parameter q to go from a state in which the DFE is the only stable state to one in
which an endemic equilibrium, and hence both ideologies, exists.
5 Conclusions
This paper considers two models in which the population is divided into non-core and core groups.
The first model considered the case of two core populations with no cross interaction between the
subpopulations and both core groups draw from the same general population. In contrast, the
second model incorporates cross interactions between the two core groups with each core group
trying to draw from the same susceptible population and from the other core group. The two
approaches model the role of competing ideologies within the subpopulations as each tries to address
how an ideology is able to establish itself when it infiltrates a core group or is not able to establish
itself if either the reruitment is too slow or the retention is not adequate. Both models also allow
for a recovery from the fanatic ideology with a return to the general population. In both models, we
were able to prove stability conditions about the various disease free equilibria and, in particular,
that establishment of the core group of an ideology is necessary for persistence of that ideology.
In the case of the non-cross interaction model, we saw competition between the core groups for
members and we saw that success depended on the trade-off between investment on recruitment
15
and investment on retention. The core group with the higher basic reproductive number will drive
the other core group to extinction, which is consistent with the persistence of only one ideology.
Building a critical mass of individuals committed to the ideology and sustaining it is crucial for
its existence and survivability. The results of this mathematical model reveal that without cross
interaction of populations being recruited by two organizations (in other words the ability to take
over from the other core group or share prospective members) both fanatic ideologies cannot co-exist
in the long run.
For the cross interaction model, we showed that in order to have persistence of both fanatic
ideologies, we need to have cross interaction of the populations being recruited by the two ideolo-
gies. This gave one of the main results of this study: that cross interactions are required in order
to achieve coexistence of competing fanatic ideologies. We showed including additional trade-offs
between recovery rate and competitive ability, that is, the ability to take over individuals from
the other core groups, may not necessarily favor the fanatic group with the largest reproductive
number and may in fact support coexistence of multiple fanatic groups and organizations.
For both models, the more efforts that an organization implements to recruit and retain its
members the more effective it will be in transmitting the ideology to other individuals but this holds
for homogeneous populations. Our model focuses on long-term dynamics and it is possible that
transient dynamics might be significant in changing environments. Future work on this topic could
incorporate more realism within the models such as including volatile or variable environmental
conditions. Additionally, in the cross-diffusion model, we could allow for cross-recruitment from
the Ei to Fj (β5, ρ5 6= 0). We could also allow for backsliding where individuals move back one
class when in the E category only (rather than exit to the general population). We could also
imagine explicitly incorporating intervention or re-education programs. For example, a recent
article describes a jihadi rehabilitation center that attempts to do just that [27]. Allowing for
additional competing ideologies, ideologies with distinct processes, limited resources of a given
ideology, or heterogeneous populations (where individual actions would play a role) would also be
natural extensions.
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